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clean-cut) approach to the conflict. It is this political skewing that explains the apparent center of gravity schizophrenia highlighted in "The Commanders' War," just as it also explains why the allies prosecuted a limited, incremental air-only campaign. Ultimately, with the lapse of time, reflection on this political skewing may also lead to a reevaluation of the critics' charge that the Kosovo conflict represented: (a) an ineffective "prolonged" operation because the aim for which we entered the war, to stop the exodus and slaughter of Kosovars, was not achieved; and, (b) an end to the conflict that was not a true victory since the division of power and the design of a multi-ethnic autonomous region remained very much in question.
An "Eccentric" War, a NATO Success
Before proceeding to the analysis of the enemy's center of gravity, it is important to note at the outset that Kosovo was an "eccentric" war." 3 A Cold War regional collective defense organization, NATO undertook the its first war and largest campaign.
It did so without specific Security Council authorization, acting offensively out-of-area (a non-Article V mission) against a sovereign country to prevent internal oppression. The expanded parameters for the character of war ("the 'who and why' of war") were new ground for NATO. 4 The U.S. opposes in principle UN approval for non-Article V mission, believing that it would give Russia and China veto rights over NATO actions to protect critical allied interests. The Europeans, on the other hand, had, until this conflict, insisted on explicit UN "legitimization" for non-article V missions, e.g., Bosnia and Croatia in the early 1990's. In explaining the French decision to go to war in March 1999 without UN authorization, Prime Minister Jospin indicated expediency was the motive, "…Since the Security Council was not able to act, we must act on our responsibilities." A French parliamentary report after the war gave guarded approval to the "political revolution" permitting NATO to intervene in a sovereign country to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO may well have set a precedent in the Kosovo war that a UN imprimatur on intervention for humanitarian ends, while desirable, is not necessary. The unusual conduct of the war ("the 'how' of war") appeared to defy conventional U.S. doctrine: early ruling out of the use of ground forces, gradual application of air power that was restricted to high altitude delivery to reduce the danger to allied pilots, and tight constraints against some civilian targets. All were at odds with conventional doctrine to apply optimal joint forces for decisive results and U.S. Air Force doctrine to maximize shock with simultaneous effects-based targeting. Briefly, Clausewitz defines the center of gravity ("schwerpunkt") as the most important source of the enemy's power and a principal objective for defeat. It is "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…and against which all energies should be directed." "The first task" in planning for war is to identify the enemy's center of gravity. It is the most effective target for a strike, and the most effective strikes come from the enemy's center of gravity. Clausewitz lists examples of diverse centers of gravity: the army in the usual operational context; in a country subject to domestic strife, generally the capital; in small countries that rely on large ones, the army of the protector; in alliances, the community of interests is what the enemy would want to unravel; and in popular uprisings, the personality of leaders and public opinion. 8 Clausewitz imposes a strict sense of discipline on the strategist to distill the sources of power in a given case into one identifiable center of gravity. It is "a major act of strategic judgment" to identify correctly the centers of gravity and how to hit the enemy's exact center of gravity. In a strictly military sense, a major battle is a collision between two opposing centers of gravity, a "zweikampf", literally "two-struggle."
"Consequently, any partial use of force not directed toward an objective that either cannot be attained by the victory itself or that does not bring about the victory should be condemned." One must constantly seek out the center of power, "daring all to win." He suggests that "no matter what the central feature of the enemy's power may be -the point on which all efforts must emerge converge -the defeat and destruction of the fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a significant feature of the campaign." Still, he admits that even in the center of gravity context , "the basic condition does not consist merely in the greatest possible concentration of forces; they 
Political constraints infuse all aspects of war, including center of gravity identification.
The political consensus-building process within NATO severely restricted the prosecution of the Kosovo conflict. "The Commanders' War" cites SACEUR Clark admitting "I was operating with the starting assumption that there was no single target that was more important, if struck, than the principle of alliance consensus and cohesion."
The articles detail the frantic and exhausting brokering Clark conducted from his office at
SHAPE among his many masters -the 19 NATO ambassadors, NATO's Secretary
General Javier Solana, and, as commander of EUCOM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. 20 Short, some distance away at U.S. air command in Italy and protected from these diplomatic pressures, was more at liberty to complain about NATO "tank plinking" in Kosovo rather than going full-force after strategic targets in Belgrade.
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Clark's statement points to the famous centerpiece of Clausewitz's theory on war.
"War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." As an "instrument," or tool, of policy, military leaders must be subordinate to political leaders and strategy must be subordinate to policy. "Policy," Clausewitz observes, "will permeate all military operations, and insofar as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them." 22 The identification of an enemy's center of gravity, therefore, must also be consistent with, appropriate to, and, in some sense, dependent upon the political 20 Unlike the Gulf War, the Kosovo war did not mobilize hundreds of thousands of men. It mobilized opinion around the world, but it was fought by no more than fifteen hundred NATO airmen and the elite Serbian airdefense specialists, probably numbering in the hundreds. It did not end in unconditional surrender, the fall of a regime, or anything that could be called definitive. It produced "an end state," still open to final definition. It was a virtual war, fought in video-teleconference rooms, using target folders flashed on screens, and all that Clark ever saw of the rush of battle was on the gun-camera footage sent every night on secure Internet systems to his headquarters in Belgium…Cabinet wars do not end with parades, garlands, and civic receptions, or with sorrowful ceremonies at graveyards. For cabinet wars never reach deep into the psyche of a people; they do not demand blood and sacrifice, and they do not reward their heroes. equity in the conflict, and thereby avoided a test of commitment for this controversial and "eccentric" war. As the war progressed, however, the stakes increased. Politically there was no alternative to a NATO victory. NATO proved willing to loosen the political restraints and threaten the use of ground troops. 26 It may be a charitable interpretation to suggest that President Clinton's May 18 statement, "I don't think we or our allies should take any options off the table"
represented not a lack of strategy, but an adjustment in strategy to achieve a political objective. 27 The conduct of the war itself clearly indicated that the military goals of Operation Allied Force were crafted and adjusted to maintain political consensus among the allies and to respond to what public opinion and domestic politics would bear. In an attempted refinement of Clausewitz, Warden proposes that the enemy's center of gravity is "a system" of five concentric rings: field forces, population, infrastructure, essential production, with leadership occupying the central and ultimate
ring. An air campaign should focus on changing the mind of enemy leadership by paralyzing it -either by attacking the leadership and its operating systems directly, or by attacking capabilities in outer rings to impose both physical and psychological paralysis on the enemy leadership. The ubiquity of air power means that it will be the key force when ground or sea forces are inadequate because of insufficient numbers or inability to reach the enemy center of gravity. With the development of stand-off precision weapons and its ability to conduct parallel warfare, air power can target all five rings simultaneously and continuously until the enemy's leadership concedes.
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The deficiency in Warden's argument is that he claims to propose a one-size-fitsall " model" for American operations well into the twenty-first century," that "if followed, will lead to realization of the political aims of the war…" 31 In making this claim, Warden fails to grasp Clausewitz's first premise of military theory: "Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as scaffolding on which the commander can rely of the war, p. CRS-3-5. Also see, Daalder and O'Hanlon, p.130, who 
EPILOGUE
Several new developments have occurred since the drafting of this paper that do not conflict with its findings.
On November 7, 1999, the New York Times reported authoritative sources had confirmed NATO was closer to ground war in Kosovo than was widely thought. In early June, British Prime Minister Blair had ordered prepared 30,000 letters to reservists in order to have 50,000 troops -half the standing army -ready to deploy to Kosovo. On June 2 -the day before Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms -key U.S. advisers had set a decision date for June 10 to begin preparations for a September invasion. The U.S. Ambassador to NATO reported that he believed that he could sell a ground war to more reluctant partners, the Germans, Italians, and the Greeks. The meeting broke up with an understanding that of three American goals for the war -NATO victory, holding the alliance together, and keeping Russia on board -victory had become the only outcome that mattered. Clinton would have to sign off on a invasion within the next few days. At about this same time, Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Ahtisaari reportedly told Milosevic that NATO would hit the city harder and was bound to invade. Additionally, Chernomyrdin made it clear that Russia would provide no more help to the Serbs.
On November 11, 1999, the New York Times noted that both France and the U.K. had published reports on lessons learned from the Kosovo conflict. Neither of these reports was available to the author. The State Department has not published a similar report, but has commissioned a long-term study. The Times also reported that Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor for the UN War Crimes Tribunal, had submitted a November 10 report to the Security Council indicating that some 2,108 bodies had been unearthed in Kosovo to date -a number far less than original estimates of 10,000-100,000.
On November 7, 1999, the Washington Post carried a detailed study of polling data suggesting that the American people were far more tolerant of American casualties in war than American leadership, military and civilian.
